The new bank account from an email
What the user reports
Calder's accounts payable inbox on 2026-12-21. On 2026-12-18 an email signed by Tamsfield Foundry's accounts department, from accounts@tamsfie1d-foundry.example, said Tamsfield had moved its banking to Harbor Line Bank and asked Calder to pay HLB-88-302117 from Tuesday's run on. The accounts payable accountant (00100241) entered the new account on Supplier bank details. Tamsfield's TF-INV-2248 (3,350.00 USD) is due on 2026-12-27, before the run after Tuesday's.
The error: Tuesday's proposal would hold TF-INV-2248 for BANK: "bank details changed on 2026-12-18 by 00100241 and not yet confirmed by a second person". The accountant asks the supervisor to "just confirm it, they're waiting for the money".
What you'll do
- See the problem as the accounts payable accountant: On Payment proposals, propose the run on 2026-12-22 with the next run on 2026-12-29, so that Tamsfield's TF-INV-2248 is paid on time.
- Find the cause: The supervisor is asked to confirm the new account so Tamsfield is paid on Tuesday. What should happen first?
- Fix it as the accounts payable supervisor.
- Prove it: run the step that failed again.
The drill runs in the lab on its own prepared copy of the fictional Calder Pumpworks, saved in this browser apart from your company. All codes and values are fictional course labels.
Answer and explanation (open after the drill)
The fix: Call Tamsfield on the number already in the supplier file. The email came from accounts@tamsfie1d-foundry.example, one character away from accounts@tamsfield-foundry.example, days before a run: confirm only if Tamsfield says it changed banks.
A second person who confirms without checking adds a signature, not a control. The check must use a channel the requester can't control: the number in the supplier file. Replying to the email reaches whoever sent it, and that address is a lookalike (accounts@tamsfie1d-foundry.example: a 1 for the l in Tamsfield). The hold can't be released while the change waits, and it shouldn't be: until someone knows which account is right, paying either one is a guess.
Why it broke
A request to change where Calder's money goes arrived by email and was entered as asked. The lab's dual control did its job: nothing is paid to Tamsfield while a change waits for a second person. The risk is the second person: under time pressure, confirming without a call-back turns the control into a formality and sends 3,350.00 USD to an account Tamsfield doesn't own.
How teams prevent it
Never confirm a bank change from the message that asked for it: call the supplier on the number already on file, and record who you spoke to. Treat a change days before a run, from an address one letter off the supplier's, as suspicious until that call. Keep the people who enter changes and those who confirm them apart.
Across teams
Accounts payable entered it; the supervisor decides; purchasing owns the relationship and knows whom to call at Tamsfield; treasury sees the payment file and would be the last to notice an account that changed last week; and if the money had gone, the loss would be Calder's, not Tamsfield's, which is still owed its invoice.
Where AI fits
Predict and assist: a model scores each change request for fraud signals (a lookalike sender, a change just before a run, a new bank or country, large open items) and puts the risky ones first in the supervisor's queue. The call-back and the decision stay with a person.
Learn more: Procure to pay end to end